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 Invisible Disability: Georgina Kleege's Sight Unseen
 SUSANNAH B. MINTZ
 This essay discusses Sight Unseen, Georgina Kleege's collection of per-
 sonal essays about partial blindness from macular degeneration, and
 explores the challenge Kleege poses to the presumably universal relation
 between vision, knowledge, and stable subjectivity. I argue that the
 semiotic and personal analysis Kleege performs in her essays disrupts the
 entrenched connection between seeing and selfhood whereby the blind
 are construed as diminished or helpless figures. Sight Unseen maxi-
 mizes the specular effects of the autobiographical situation, making
 transgressively visible the anomalous body that patriarchal discourse
 has sought to control and that feminist theory has largely ignored as a
 meaningful category of identity. The text manifests the defining impact
 of disability on a woman's idea of herself in a culture in which the
 parameters of normative gendered identity are circulated largely through
 visual imagery, but in turn contests the ontological primacy of vision by
 orienting the narrative toward the new focal point of blindness. Unveil-
 ing the fictions surrounding sightedness as a stable mode of access to
 identity and reality, Kleege subverts the dominance of myths of knowl-
 edge and mastery granted to the eyes.
 Keywords: blindness / blindness narrative / disability narrative / women's
 autobiography / women and blindness
 In a short piece entitled "Autobiography as Performative Utterance,"
 Michael Berube writes, "the conditions under which certain authors
 claim the authority of autobiography are sometimes exceptionally hostile
 to the claim" (2000, 341). Making a link between slave narrative and the
 life-writing of people with cognitive disabilities, Berube argues that self-
 representation serves the radical and political function of declaring a self
 worthy to be named-asserting, in effect, that it does matter who speaks
 and that the speaker is a legitimate self-which in turn disrupts the kinds
 of dehumanizing ideologies that equate difference with unworthiness,
 inferiority, and lack.' For a disabled woman, the act of writing herself into
 a textual identity entails combating a triple erasure-from the long his-
 tory of autobiography in the West, which has typically excluded women's
 experience from the kinds of life-stories deemed worthy of recording; and
 from able-bodied culture and feminist theory alike, in which disability is
 either stigmatized as the sign of failure and inadequacy, or simply ignored
 altogether as a meaningful component of identity. It is from a position of
 cultural invisibility, then, that the disabled female life-writer struggles
 ?)2002 NWSA JOURNAL, VOL. 14 No. 3 (FALL)
This content downloaded from 141.222.114.59 on Fri, 10 Nov 2017 10:58:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 15 6 SUSANNAH B. MINTZ
 toward a "performative utterance" that will announce the authority of
 her multiply unspeakable self.
 To be female and disabled in Western culture is to straddle a divide
 between the Cartesian severing of mind and body that understands sub-
 jectivity as cognitive and immaterial, and the linkage of body and self
 effected by negative attitudes toward corporeal difference. Disability
 narratives that aim to prove that identity is not a function of the body
 capitulate to the very condemning associations against which they would
 protect their authors; separating a "higher" self from the lowly disability
 merely reinscribes the sort of prejudice that reads temperament according
 to the delineations of the body. Disabled women's autobiographical texts
 seek to retrieve corporeality from the narrative and cultural margins,
 but in writing "as" bodies, disabled women do more than simply valorize
 their anomalous shapes or styles. Where traditional autobiographies by
 men presume universality and representative status, women's disabil-
 ity narratives tend to be more cautious about the dangers to a feminist
 agenda of making essentialized statements about female, disabled experi-
 ence. Keenly aware of the impossibility of generalizing between various
 forms of physical impairment, they refuse to speak for anyone but them-
 selves. In this way, much disabled women's life-writing maps out a new
 autobiographical I, one that challenges Western culture's paradigmatic
 model of singular, will-driven, or consciousness-driven identity.
 If disability narratives by women often revise the narrative conven-
 tions that underwrite patriarchal norms of disembodied, autonomous
 identity, they also challenge the ableist assumptions of contemporary
 feminism's "return" to the body, demanding recognition of bodies that
 do not abide by feminist ideals of social and professional independence,
 sexual and reproductive agency. Feminist disability scholars have pointed
 out that mainstream feminism's critique of patriarchal myths of women
 as essentially sexual and maternal ignores the fact that ableist culture
 also deems disabled women to be essentially asexual and unmaternal.
 As Michelle Fine and Adrienne Asch argue, disabled women have been
 "severed ... from the sisterhood" by nondisabled feminists fearful of the
 loss of control and perceived helplessness of physical impairment (1988,
 4). A body that suffers may not inspire the kind of celebratory rhetoric
 typical of Irigaray and Cixous, for example, and Susan Wendell makes the
 emphatic point that very real bodily limitations may also be overlooked
 by post-structuralist feminist accounts of cultural and discursive oppres-
 sion (1996). In a different way, describing the joys of heterosexual sex or
 conventional marriage may be an unexpectedly subversive feminist act
 for a disabled woman taught not so much that her sexuality is a source
 of shame, but rather that she is altogether incapable of experiencing or
 arousing sexual desire. From this perspective, when a disabled woman
 represents herself in terms of her erotic and/or maternal experience, her
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 narrative can be openly resistant in ways that an able-bodied feminist
 reading may mistakenly disregard.
 Irregular bodies, bodies in pain or in need of care, bodies that are
 far from unequivocal sources of pleasure-such is the corporeality that
 disabled women's autobiography seeks to make visible in both material
 and ideological terms. By showing that identity is inextricable from the
 afflicted bodies whose particulars they narrate, bodies marginalized by
 both gender as well as form or dysfunction, disabled women autobiog-
 raphers level a public critique against both masculinist and able-bodied
 attitudes, suggesting that the personal experience of a disabled body is
 inherently connected to cultural myths about gender and normality. Yet
 unlike much contemporary self-writing by disabled women, Georgina
 Kleege's Sight Unseen is more an indictment of negative representations
 of the blind, and of cultural mythologies about perception, eye contact,
 and normal behavior, than it is the story of one woman's experience of
 losing her sight (1999a). A collection of autobiographical essays that "do
 not pretend to offer a definitive view of anyone's blindness" but her own
 Sight Unseen paradoxically minimizes autobiographical detail in favor
 of cultural and semiotic analysis (5). Yet I would argue that Kleege's sup-
 pression of personal revelation serves an important feminist argument, in
 that it calls particular attention to the dynamics of gazing. Kleege makes
 specularity the spectacle, putting vision itself, rather than her body, on
 display.
 Compared to recent work by such writers as Nancy Mairs, Lucy Greely,
 Cheryl Marie Wade, and Anne Finger, Sight Unseen is especially striking
 for its exclusion of any discussion of how Kleege feels about her sexuality
 or "femininity," or about how her blindness might intersect with tradi-
 tional female roles of mother or caretaker.2 Kleege's collection follows a
 different path: its parameters are neither a masculinist public domain, a
 feminized domestic sphere, nor the explicitly contestatory and sexual-
 ized space carved out by many disabled women writers. While the perfor-
 mative display of body and sexuality in works by other disabled women
 forces a re-evaluation of normative conceptions of beauty, desire, and
 "legitimate" female identity, Kleege's investment lies more in decipher-
 ing how people see than with the telling of her own story, and she thus
 subordinates her childhood and "interior" experience to her adult, active
 participation in a sighted world. Implicitly invoking women's cultural
 position as passive and preoccupied with their own appearance-what
 other disabled women might deconstruct by actively examining their
 bodies in terms of the social relations that define them as abnormal-
 Kleege authorizes her blind gaze to wrench apart the equation of seeing
 with knowing, exploding conventional binaries of male and female, sub-
 ject and object, seer and seen.
 Kleege argues at the start of Sight Unseen that the linear structure
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 of conventional blindness autobiographies reaffirms the idea that blind-
 ness can be separated from the self as an affliction one overcomes; a
 narrative of transcendence and resolution "presupposes that blindness
 is somehow outside oneself" (4). Describing her own book as a "'coming
 out' narrative," she suggests that the radical intent of Sight Unseen is to
 claim blindness as constitutive of identity in ways that are surprisingly,
 unfamiliarly positive (5). The three sections of the text proceed from the
 opening discussion of "Blindness and Culture" through "Blind Phenom-
 enology" to final essays on "Voice, Texture, [and] Identity." In one way,
 this sequence seems to move us steadily inward, ever closer to some
 authentic Kleege. But I would argue that the trajectory of Kleege's text
 is in fact deliberately anti-linear, non-progressive, and fragmentary in a
 way consistent with the discontinuities of both female and disabled exis-
 tence.3 Sight Unseen charts a mock journey or quest that presents the self
 not as an isolated individual triumphing over cultural forces, but rather
 as something one accumulates in contact with the stuff of culture. In its
 gesture toward, and subsequent rupture of, the typical life-path structure
 of men's self-writing, Sight Unseen exposes what is usually left invisible
 in canonical autobiographies-the influence of cultural mythology, the
 expectation of a normal body, the triumph of mind and will over the body
 and the circumstances of birth. Culture is thus not so much a secondary
 background against which Kleege's singular subjectivity stands out in
 high relief, but rather the very material from which she explicitly fash-
 ions a sense of self.
 When she asks, "Incompetent, dependent, potentially unruly, sexu-
 ally deviant-is this really how the sighted see the blind?" (57), Kleege
 might also be speaking of how patriarchal culture views women. Her
 project thus becomes a doubled act of dismantling what Susan Wendell
 has referred to as the "disciplines of normality" (1996, 88). If inhabiting
 a world that privileges sighted men requires Kleege to dis-identify with
 herself as blind and as a woman, then writing herself into a blind iden-
 tity means having to create new and acceptable versions of blindness
 that contest inhibiting stereotypes-or as Wendell puts it, the "young,
 healthy, professionally successful blind woman who has 'overcome' her
 handicap with education" (1996, 12). To an extent, Kleege actually con-
 forms to this image. Yet her exploration of blindness and vision seeks
 not to prove equality with the sighted nor to announce her triumph over
 impairment, but rather to dislocate her readers, to complicate the grounds
 on which dominant assumptions about blindness are constructed, and
 to provoke readers toward a more subtle awareness of the gendered rela-
 tionship between vision and power. Sight Unseen is a manifesto for
 change, levying a powerful charge against both patriarchal and able-
 bodied ideology.
 In the first sentence of Sight Unseen, Kleege announces, "Writing this
 book made me blind" (1). Such a proclamation establishes an important
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 framework for this collection of personal essays, which investigate repre-
 sentations of blindness and sight through the conceptual lens of Kleege's
 own partial vision. The book's opening gambit invokes an entrenched
 cultural prejudice that reads illness as a kind of punishment, a sign of
 mental weakness or moral lapse. The implication that Kleege might
 have made herself sick by writing links her visual impairment with the
 unfeminine self-indulgence of art, even as it seems designed to instigate
 readers' pity for her diminished capacity. The author's physical limitation
 becomes the mark of her psychological overreaching, and the proof of her
 audience's difference from her. Yet Kleege summons the myth of disabil-
 ity as Otherness and failure only to disrupt it. Declared legally blind due
 to macular degeneration at the age of eleven, Kleege did not literally go
 blind during the composition of the book, but her statement underscores
 the relationship between self-creation and writing that forms the basis
 of ideological resistance in many feminist disability narratives. Kleege
 suggests that only through the construction of Sight Unseen was she
 able to discover new, positive meanings for blindness, and thus to claim
 a blind identity on her own definitional terms. Calling herself blind is not
 a capitulation to enfeeblement or helplessness, but rather an act of defiant
 self-re-creation.
 Kleege's story foregrounds the conflictedness of female disabled sub-
 jectivity in a culture that privileges male able-bodied independence, the
 paradox of having to accept marginalized status along with the pressure
 to conform and perform normally The internalized stigma of blindness,
 Kleege argues-the "burden of negative connotations and dreaded asso-
 ciations"-encourages blind people "to sham sight" through technology
 and adaptation (19), even as those very efforts serve as a reminder of their
 failure to meet culturally agreed-upon designations of normality. Kleege
 writes that as her own vision began to deteriorate as a child, she learned
 quickly to disguise her difficulty reading books and blackboards, and
 recognizing distant objects, by mimicking the body gestures, the tone of
 voice, even the facial expressions associated with sightedness. She thus
 raises questions about how a culture determines the limits of normal
 behavior, appearance, or physical ability, and about how we understand
 and experience illnesses that don't render a person obviously or visibly
 disabled. Though Kleege's visual acuity is less than 20/200 (the barrier of
 legal blindness), she is nonetheless able to "pas[s] as sighted" in certain
 social situations (12); at the same time, she calls herself "imperfectly
 blind" (150), as if to suggest that what sight she has actually debars her
 from full participation in the category of blindness. In this way, Kleege's
 liminal condition shows us how the boundaries of identity are both
 highly arbitrary and easily disturbed.
 Perhaps more importantly, however, Sight Unseen confronts a sighted
 reader's complacent trust in the certitudes of perception by situating the
 so-called norm on the margins of Kleege's own visual experience. Her
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 descriptions of what her eyes perceive, and how she actually looks at an
 object, challenge a normative sense of the "right way" to see (96). Because
 her form of macular degeneration leaves a very large "blind spot" in the
 middle of her vision, Kleege must "move [her] attention off center, view-
 ing the world askance" (104). She holds objects an inch from her face, slid-
 ing her eyes from one edge to another in order to see with her peripheral
 vision. She stands "a foot" away from (93), then edges "closer and closer"
 to (94), huge canvasses in museums. Her "flawed vision" necessitates
 a kind of literal close reading or Nietzschean slow seeing-two of the
 text's controlling metaphors (147). All this slowing-down and moving-in
 defies the notion that "seeing is both instantaneous and absolute," or that
 "[s]ight provides instantaneous access to reality" (96). If the only proper
 way to see "is to take something in at a glance and possess it whole, com-
 prehending all its complexities" (96), Kleege suggests, then her sidelong
 way of looking, "circumambulat[ing]" objects (104), becomes an ideologi-
 cal metaphor for displacing the eyes as the source of power and eyesight
 as a guarantor of knowledge and identity.
 Kleege's description of various ways of seeing calls attention to the
 gendered dynamics of looking. The objectifying gaze that purports to
 guarantee wholeness-long associated with the mechanisms of patri-
 archal power and manifested in the blazons of Petrarchan poets, in the
 Renaissance penchant for dissection, in the scopophilic certitudes of
 Enlightenment philosophy, Freudian and later Lacanian psychoanalysis-
 occludes even as it anticipates a woman's returning look. So thoroughly is
 subjectivity bound up with vision that the possibility of a woman look-
 ing back has provoked fears of castration, a dismantling or disabling of
 coherent male identity, even as the so-called female gaze has been said
 to reclaim the power to determine subjectivity. But Kleege goes beyond
 merely inverting a gendered specular exchange. Introducing herself as the
 legitimate subject of a manner of looking that Slavoj Zizek might define
 as "awry" (1992),4 Kleege achieves something more complex than simply
 authorizing herself as a viewer; she tears down not only patriarchal trust
 in vision, but also the notion that women can look (or look back) in a way
 that confers or guarantees selfhood.5 Neither the freak show spectacle
 who must protest her basic humanity to readers (what Kleege describes
 as the "conventional goal of blind autobiography" [3]), nor a hero whose
 will and fortitude defeat the defects of the body, Kleege repeatedly focuses
 her attention on her readers, as if staring directly at them: "Look at me
 when I'm talking to you," she demands. "Do you really see all that you
 say? . . . Aren't you projecting your own expectations, interpretations,
 or desires onto my blank eyes?" (138). In one way, such provocations
 empower Kleege as the origin of language and meaning: her vision is
 panoptical (she knows where one's gaze is directed) and capable of unde-
 tected spying; she can control where one looks and even what impression
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 one might have of the view. But the display of monological-and perhaps
 Medusan-visual power is deceptive; Kleege's manner of looking moves
 her, and her readers, to the margins, where meanings are discovered
 rather than imposed. Sight Unseen redefines the meaning of blindness
 not so much by attempting to establish an equivalency between vision
 and blindness, but rather by disabling sightedness itself, undermining its
 epistemological stability. Kleege uses her gradual, tactile, relational way
 of seeing to illustrate that "there is no one way to look . . . no optimum
 vantage point or viewing condition" (147). Hers is a gaze transformed, a
 look whose approach to the stuff of the world, and whose sense of its own
 power, contests not just the idea that men dominate through looking,
 but also more recent feminist theorizing, particularly in studies of film,
 about the viability of an active female gaze.
 In the first several essays of Sight Unseen, Kleege complicates gendered
 stereotypes about blindness and vision by demonstrating her facility for
 a variety of sighted activities. In "Blind Nightmares" and "In Oedipus'
 Shadow," Kleege presents herself as a skilled semiotician, deftly unpack-
 ing representations of blindness in literature and film. In "The Mind's
 Eye," she details her penchant for art museums and her unusual way
 of looking at paintings. In each of these instances, Kleege transforms
 a conventional understanding of what it means to be blind or sighted:
 how has a "legally blind" woman seen the movies and read the books
 she describes? What exactly does she see at the museum? Where other
 women writers tend to generate a critique of dominant paradigms of dis-
 ability strictly through personal experience, Kleege starts her story with
 an extended interpretation of culture's stories about blindness and vision.
 Beginning with Oedipus and ranging through texts as divergent as Jane
 Eyre, the 1967 film Wait Until Dark, and Monet's Waterlilies, Kleege
 situates herself as just one other looker, as a participant in the visual
 world, a teacher as well as a partner in the project of seeing. In short,
 she makes us viewers together, eliding herself as the object of our atten-
 tion while simultaneously using her visual perspective to argue for the
 limitations of sight as one's sole or primary means of knowing the world.
 Kleege stretches the limits of identification with her readers, avoiding the
 dual seductions of voyeurism and sympathy-indeed, for much of Sight
 Unseen we are not looking at Georgina Kleege at all, but rather at habits
 of looking themselves.
 The cumulative and strategic effect of Kleege's discussion of movies
 and literature through two chapters is clearly to dissociate her from
 characterizations of the blind as "supernatural or subhuman, alien or
 animal," "different" and "dangerous" (28), and of blindness as symbolic
 of "fragility and helplessness" (55), "divine retribution" (71), or "the com-
 plete loss of personal, sexual, and political power" (69). But displaying her
 dexterity as a cultural critic allows Kleege not to simply protest the inva-
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 lidity of such negative stereotypes; more to the point, she proves through
 her own performance of intellectual analysis their single-minded and
 reductive attitudes about loss of sight. Kleege makes her case less through
 personal outcry than through a scholarly marshalling of evidence, dis-
 mantling "facile assumptions about blindness" by exposing the underly-
 ing cultural anxieties that motivate those assumptions in the first place
 (65). Narratives about blindness "are not about blindness at all," as Kleege
 suggests (58), but rather about a need to guarantee the privileged status
 of the sighted-a need that, in its turn, emerges from fears about the fra-
 gility and unpredictability of embodied identity. In what Susan Wendell
 has called "the flight from the rejected body," disability signifies all that
 must be carefully guarded against by normative corporeality: "tragic
 loss, weakness, passivity, dependency, helplessness, shame, and global
 incompetence" (1996, 83, 63). Kleege's staging of herself as an interpreter
 of myths of blindness thus serves as a specific refutation of the kinds
 of associations Wendell enumerates; far from weak, passive, or incom-
 petent, Kleege takes charge-she surveys the ideological territory, she
 infiltrates, she squares off against an imagined reader's resistance to any
 suggestion that sightedness is less than immediate and unfailing. "[W]hy
 not break this absolute dependence you have on your eyesight?" Kleege
 queries (32). "The sighted can be so touchingly naive about vision" (96).
 Positioned at the start of Sight Unseen, Kleege's deconstructive exami-
 nation of blindness in film and literature deflects attention away from
 Kleege herself-from the personal or intimate details one tends to associ-
 ate with the autobiographical mode for women-to such an extent that
 we lose sight of Kleege altogether, at least temporarily. We may forget
 that her own vision is at stake, here, too-even that she herself is blind,
 so thoroughly do we associate reading and movie-going with sightedness.
 Not only do these chapters demand, therefore, that we re-examine stereo-
 types about the blind; perhaps more pointedly, Kleege also puts pressure
 on the category of sightedness. Blindness-as a trope, a symbol, an event
 that must be interpreted and invested with meaning-is situated in the
 culture, rather than the individual author, and Kleege further insists that
 whatever diminishment a blind person experiences is a function of social
 relations, rather than personal insufficiency. Rejecting sustained autobio-
 graphical narrative at the start of her text, Kleege thus enacts on the page
 the sort of favorable depiction of blind people that she fantasizes might
 someday be possible in film: "blindness would become invisible," Kleege
 writes, because "a 'realistic' blind person on screen would have so mas-
 tered the skills of blindness that there would be no need to draw attention
 to them" (57). Kleege's phrasing here-the "skills of blindness"-dis-
 solves impaired vision into just one other form of normal behavior. To
 speak of the skills of blindness rather than the skills of seeing is to
 disturb the hierarchical binary, figuring blindness not as tragic dimin-
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 ishment but as something anyone could learn to do, even as a kind of
 expertise or virtuosity. Indeed, Kleege encourages her readers to practice
 blindness, as a way of decentering sight and relinquishing their monologi-
 cal-and ultimately anxiety-driven-grip on vision as one's primary mode
 of contact with, and sense of rootedness within, one's environment.
 Something more overtly gendered is also at work in Kleege's display
 of her proficiency as a reader of text. Comparing male and female blind
 characters, she writes, "While movies occasionally allow blind men
 some instructive wit and wisdom, blind women are nothing but need.
 . . . Their helplessness is surpassed only by their passivity and despera-
 tion" (51). What's more, the "obsessive self-preoccupation" expected of
 blind women in cinema would "label a sighted woman as a dangerous
 vamp" (55). Such statements remind us that if patriarchal ideology tends
 to pinion women generally in the paradox of emotional immaturity and
 sexual threat, blind women may have an even more vexed relationship
 to the self-appraisal of autobiography. At the start of the book, Kleege
 recounts the behavior of her students when she first informs them that
 she's blind: they stare at her, "Eyeing her askance," gazes "intent" (9-10).
 To identify herself as blind, as she does in the first sentence of Sight
 Unseen, is to invite and perhaps amplify the objectifying looks of sighted
 readers, whether female or male. That Kleege looks so consistently
 outward frustrates readers' desire to see her, thus refusing the kinds of
 stereotypes that encode blind women in film as at once frail and child-
 like, egotistical and sexually voracious. The blind characters that Kleege
 explores (most often the creations of male writers and directors) may
 require the assistance of male heroes to rescue and protect them, but it
 is Kleege herself in Sight Unseen who seeks to save sighted readers from
 cultural misapprehensions about blind identity. Kleege is thus a woman
 who sees much more than herself being seen. Keenly aware that blind-
 ness makes women both "unsightly" (54) and "tempting to men" pre-
 cisely because they can't "look back" (56), Kleege-as-author looks awry,
 eyes the world askance, and rends the sighted world's faith in a stable
 connection between vision and knowledge, seeing and being whole.
 When we enter a Matisse exhibit with Kleege, her unique way of seeing
 comes more fully to the fore of her narrative. Kleege describes her behav-
 ior in museums in highly physical terms, as a kind of dance: "I perform
 a slow minuet before each painting, stepping forward and back, sweeping
 my gaze from edge to edge" (95). Such a procedure seems sequential and
 partial, resulting not in the instant intake, the global impression that the
 sighted claim to experience, but something more interactive, involving
 the whole body's motion in the process of looking. As such, Kleege's sight
 is neither complacently unquestioned nor singular, but rather follows
 feminist theorizing about embodied identity toward a more partial and
 relational form of vision. Because she proceeds so methodically, Kleege
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 forces us to slow down too, and to reconsider the very process of making
 meaning out of what we see. To see slowly is to resist the idea that we
 "see" wholly and instinctively, that through seeing we achieve mastery
 over the phenomena of the world. From up close, Kleege observes details
 that casual viewing "overlooks"-texture, thickness, size, color. "The
 most 'realistic' eye" in a painting "may be no more than a swirl of brown
 with a thin comma of white laid over," Monet's waterlilies are "crusty"
 rather than "liquid," and abstract paintings have "depth and form" from
 two inches away (94). Reading such descriptions, we begin both to imag-
 ine what Kleege sees as well as to remember our own impressions of what
 painting looks like, an overlap that serves less to reify Kleege's identity
 as impaired than to upend our belief in a single, correct way of look-
 ing-always to be understood as a correct way of being.
 Kleege, then, is what Shakespeare might have called the master-mis-
 tress of vision and blindness alike, both instructor and student of the
 dynamics of looking and interpreting what can be seen. Cautious about
 positioning herself as "instructive spectacle, useful to everyone but
 [her]self" (90), she keeps readerly attention focused on the ambiguities
 and deceptions of sight generally, not the anguish or struggle of losing
 her sight in particular.6 Yet there is one sighted activity Kleege emphati-
 cally cannot participate in: eye contact. Where Sight Unseen starts from
 the premise that Kleege "find[s] it easy to imagine what it's like to be
 sighted" (3) because the dominant culture-from infrastructure to ideol-
 ogy-is so fully oriented toward the sighted, the chapter entitled "Here's
 Looking at You" admits to feeling "confus[ed]" (122) by the "mystery"
 (124) of eye contact. Macular degeneration makes it impossible for Kleege
 to pick up facial details or even to perceive the totality of a person's face
 in a single glance. "When I try to look someone in the eyes," she explains,
 "he disappears" (124). Since the same "off-center gaze" that troubles her
 fellow museum-goers makes her appear "shy, distracted, suspicious,
 bored, or untrustworthy" (124), Kleege "fake[s]" eye contact (138), aiming
 her eyes and face in the right direction, "perform[ing] tricks" (126) with
 her eyes that mimic the concentrated intimacy, the assertiveness or hon-
 esty associated with a direct look.7
 That Kleege's experience of seeing and feeling "nothing" could be
 interpreted as "the most significant visual exchange" (125) with another
 person, throws into question the privileged cultural and theoretical status
 accorded an exchange of looks. "Here's Looking at You" repudiates the
 idea that because they are "excluded from [the] constant, kinetic inter-
 change" of eye contact, the blind "must take the sighted's word" for its
 importance and trustworthiness (131). Kleege focuses her discussion on
 what eye contact is believed to reveal-the "truth" of a person's psychi-
 cal or ontological state-as well as on the contextual data that contribute
 to our assessment of the "genuine" emotion allegedly communicated by
 the eyes. What the sighted attribute solely to eye-to-eye understanding,
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 for instance, Kleege explains as a function of the entire face and body:
 stretched skin, widened eyelids, light reflected off of the eyeballs, fur-
 rowed brows, and twitching lips. Again, the effect is to shift the reader's
 perspective away from the eyes themselves and onto what surrounds
 them. Compared to the specular exactness claimed by the sighted, Kleege
 admits that she "focus[es] too much on the peripheral details" (128) for
 her to appreciate fully the significance of eye contact. Yet what lies at the
 periphery of vision is precisely Kleege's concern in Sight Unseen. Call-
 ing attention to the stage of looking-all the details from body posture
 to setting to desire and projection-Kleege suggests that the presumed
 guarantees of visual contact are, on the one hand, partial and gradual, and
 on the other comprised of myriad pieces of information that supplement
 what the eyes alone exhibit. Thus by conveying to her readers all that
 presses into a scene of looking from the surround, Kleege explodes any
 idea that we have access to, that we can "know," the other's "interior"
 just by looking into his or her eyes.
 As a result of what Kleege can't see, the essay concentrates on what she
 knows, transforming a putative lack into a cognitive advantage. "Here's
 Looking at You" ranges from the physiology of "the visual system" (128),
 to the artificial strategies (air-brushing, dilating eye drops) employed
 by actors and fashion models to maximize the specular effects of their
 appearance on film, to the sighted habit of employing metaphors that
 "point to the eyes . . . as the site of all significant experience" (131). At
 the same time, however, Kleege also repeats such words and phrases as
 "apparently," "I assume," "I'd like to see," "I'm not sure," "I've heard
 tell," even "I miss the point." These terms seem to emphasize the cul-
 tural displacement of a disabled woman assumed to be "not in full pos-
 session of [her] reasoning powers" (Keith 1996, 86); as one who can't make
 eye contact, Kleege doesn't "get it," and thus she speaks tentatively, she
 seems intellectually blunted, out of the social loop. Yet the fundamental
 pressure point here is less blindness than sighted arrogance about eye
 contact, with all the psychological, erotic, epistemological charge of that
 phrase held under scrutiny. Kleege situates herself in a sighted milieu
 where stories are trafficked as truth, a world where people uncritically
 "tell" the appropriate narratives of cultural myth. The doubt and uncer-
 tainty implied by "apparently" or "assume" pertains not at all to Kleege's
 limited understanding, then, but instead level the author's skepticism
 against what people insist they can discern from the eyes. By figuring the
 certitudes of eye contact as the product of a kind of rumor-mill, Kleege
 interrogates one of sighted culture's most sacred forms of accessing anoth-
 er's true self, refusing to take for granted, to take anyone's word for, what
 constitutes meaning, significant experience, or identity.
 A discussion of the local, interpersonal event of eye contact, then,
 becomes a critique of patriarchal technologies of understanding, of cul-
 turally sanctioned mechanisms of interpretation and assessment. Kleege
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 foregrounds the way in which sighted ideology reduces knowledge and
 meaning to the single action of seeing, wholly subsuming the participa-
 tion of bodies, expectations, and desires into the mythologized behavior
 of eyes. She concedes an evolutionary and biological basis for the impor-
 tance of vision (citing, for example, mother-infant mirroring and the
 predatory advantage of forward-directed eyes), but she refutes the sym-
 bolized, romanticized, poeticized assumptions about eye contact that
 deny legitimacy to other forms of making contact with the world. The
 sheer "diversity" of the stories Kleege recounts about the impact of eye
 contact reveals more, finally, about sighted people's belief in its author-
 ity than about any real access it has to "reality." Perhaps more pointedly,
 Kleege makes it clear that social codes governing visual interaction are
 embedded in patriarchal mythology: whether she is looking at photo-
 graphs of fashion models, reading self-defense literature that cautions
 women against eye contact with strangers, or pondering romantic cliches
 about love at first sight, Kleege links the cultural privileging of vision
 with both physical and discursive violence. Yet if power cannot be said
 to reside in one's ability to see, as Sight Unseen endeavors to prove, then
 power itself must become open to reclamation, and identities constructed
 within certain cultural configurations of power are in turn available for
 rewriting, revision. Kleege performs her own version of eye contact in
 this chapter. "Pull the wool off your eyes," she commands her readers.
 "Tell me what you see" (138).
 If it is possible to see in a different manner-off-center, askew, up-
 close, and side-to-side-Sight Unseen also argues that we can "see"
 with a different part of the body. To contest sight as culture's dominant
 mode of knowing (a structure that necessarily assumes the blind as less
 than fully human or grants them supererogatory and highly idealized
 "insight"), Kleege defocuses the eyes entirely and shifts to the hands,
 examining various forms of touch as an additional metaphor for relating
 to the world. Describing her father, for example, an artist known for large-
 scale sculpture, Kleege relates an early memory of him helping her to
 weld together pieces of metal: "My hand moves inside my father's hand.
 His index finger lifts and points. I look where he points. I draw the flame
 to the point.... Like most of our conversations, this one was essentially
 wordless, conducted hand-to-hand, my small hand inside his" (163). The
 scene accumulates images of both real and symbolic connection-the
 fused scraps of metal, one small hand clasped within another, daughter to
 father, human to metal, idea to "form and dimension" (163)-that reflect
 a central preoccupation in Sight Unseen. To be "hand-in-hand" with the
 world is to refuse a subject position defined by static hierarchies of gender
 and health that equate women with receptive passivity, physical differ-
 ence with helplessness. Though she was not yet blind in the scene above,
 the metaphor of welding shapes one of Sight Unseen's central proposi-
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 tions: American cultural myths of self-reliance and isolationist identity
 privilege male able-bodiedness, and condemn intersubjective relations,
 caretaking, and disability as signs of, or thresholds onto, regressive depen-
 dency. In contrast, Kleege argues for reciprocity and mutuality, for "con-
 versations" between people and between people and things in the world
 that unite body and idea, hands and eyes, words and movement. Kleege
 suggests that communication does not derive solely from sight (that,
 indeed, it may not even require sight), and that it is only through the
 mutual interaction of embodied selves that the myriad seams of reality
 and identity stay "fast and lasting" (163). Relationality, then, in Kleege's
 articulation of it, informs everything that she does-from seeing and
 reading to teaching, writing, making art-but in a way that challenges
 reductive models of female identity as selflessly oriented toward others
 and others' feelings.8 Importantly, the scene of welding with her father
 emblematizes a relational experience in which meaning emerges from
 active partnership, rather than domination or mastery.
 The quintessential manifestation of this dialectical phenomenology,
 the most potent instance of "hand-in-hand" contact with information
 and meaning, is Kleege's decision to learn braille, a process she begins
 only as an adult. Reading braille is profoundly physical, involving the
 whole self from fingertips and arms, through the shoulders and into the
 head, brain, mind. Reading this way, Kleege reactivates her body in com-
 munication with the world, empowering her hands in the place of her
 eyes. But she does more than propose hand reading as secondary compen-
 sation for the loss of sight, and she "returns" to a body that is signified
 not only as different, but in fact as deviant (this move is at once literal,
 textual, and theoretical, as Kleege turns from the more intellectualized
 chapters of the first part of Sight Unseen to chapters that foreground
 her corporeal self).9 "Close reading" had once signified Kleege's literal
 proximity to a computer screen or a printed page-she describes herself
 as "the physical embodiment of close reading" (198)-and therefore
 measured the distance between Kleege and "normally" sighted indi-
 viduals, whose eyes "process as many as a dozen [characters] at a time"
 compared to Kleege's "three" (199). But despite her wry analogy to the
 habit of "dwell[ing]" (197) closely over textual detail (Kleege was a Yale
 undergraduate and writes that she "felt physically well-suited, if not pre-
 destined, to be a close reader" [198]), the liberating possibilities afforded
 her by braille have little to do with New Critical interpretive practice or
 ideology. The tactile reading of braille allows Kleege to rediscover a way
 of being in the body that the struggle to read with her eyes had forced her
 to relinquish. With her eyes, Kleege is in fact an inefficient reader; with
 braille she reads more quickly, with less strain, and greater mobility. With
 her hands at work, Kleege can in fact move away from the page, letting
 her body uncoil, stretch out, and relax: "The frantic uncertainty of read-
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 ing print was gone. And there was no pain ... I was serene, floating" (204).
 Moreover, hand reading has the unexpected effect of disguising Kleege's
 visual impairment. Comparing the logistical problems of giving public
 readings by sight to the ease of reading by braille, Kleege writes that
 "[her] blindness is less visible to [her] audience" (227). In a paradoxical
 way, reading braille makes Kleege both more and less "blind"; it is one
 of the "skills" of blindness that indicates her difference from the sighted
 world even as it strenuously resists negative connotations of failure or
 inadequacy.
 Reading braille thus carries an even more political valence in that it
 serves to mark identity: "the way we read defines who we are" (217). To
 choose braille, to read not with the eyes but with the fingers, is to seem
 to regress to a benighted state of incapacity and to openly identify one-
 self as disabled, to repudiate the promise of low-vision aids and thus of
 "progress"-but it is also, accordingly, to reject sightedness altogether,
 and so to defiantly claim disinterest in trying to be or seem "normal."
 Particularly because Kleege does have some sight, because she can,
 however "imperfectly," read with her eyes, her decision to learn braille
 inspires resistance and anxiety from those who are threatened by her
 apparent indifference to a sighted way of life: "braille is a part of the dim
 and dire past, not the desirable present," Kleege explains; "My desire to
 learn braille cast me as an eccentric Luddite" (215). The issue is less old-
 fashioned recalcitrance about technology, of course, than it is the choice
 of "blind" behavior over sighted, a willingness to "be seen" as blind when
 gadgets and machinery could allow her to mimic the practices of the
 sighted. Kleege makes the point that reading braille has to do with more
 than just convenience, physical comfort, access to materials, or lower
 costs; a far more confrontational desire to challenge the dominance of
 the norm is at stake here, a call to widen the array of ways of being in the
 world and of articulating subjectivity. "The first time I read my name in
 braille," Kleege remarks, "made me muse on identity again: 'This is me
 in braille"' (127-8). Reading braille thus effects a shift iin Kleege's sense
 of herself as a person and as blind; far from confining her to a state of
 diminishment, braille is generative, creating new possibilities, surprising
 her with the discovery of an unfamiliar but no less legitimate self. Braille
 enables Kleege to move back and forth across the divide between ability
 and disability, to transgress and thus to destabilize that boundary. "Me in
 braille" is just one more self, one more version of Georgina Kleege.
 The intersection of feminist and disability theory seems obvious here.
 Kleege "respells" her name, and thus herself, both in braille and then
 in the pages of Sight Unseen. Layering text on text, she claims multiple
 identities that depend on particular languages she knows, some of which
 exclude her sighted readers; "she" becomes mobile and elusive.'0 But at
 the same time, her braille identity, no less than the self she creates in her
This content downloaded from 141.222.114.59 on Fri, 10 Nov 2017 10:58:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 INVISIBLE DISABILITY 169
 book, has no meaning apart from her physical condition: the material
 reality of the body produces the discursive play. Kleege's representation
 of herself in a language she must reclaim from the margins of sighted cul-
 ture effects a breach with what Leigh Gilmore has called "a patriarchal
 regime of names" (2001, 124); but unlike writers whose self-representa-
 tional project indulges the ambiguity of signification at the expense of
 bodily specificity, Kleege's act of naming and identifying herself ("This
 is me in braille") is rooted in the material condition of her eyes. Despite
 its origin in the gradual loss of her sight, reading herself in braille is thus
 a form of gain for Kleege, one further implement with which she can tra-
 verse, and thereby denaturalize, the boundaries of disability and health,
 passivity and agency, patriarchal authority and the silencing of women.
 There is a kind of patrilineal narrative at work in Sight Unseen, but
 it is a revisionary one that problematizes fatherly law. "Up Close, In
 Touch" recounts Kleege's pursuit not only of braille but also of the life of
 Louis Braille himself, including an odyssey to the Braille Museum at his
 birthplace in Coupvray, France."' Kleege details the accident that blinded
 Braille as a child and his later perfection, as a teenager at the Paris Insti-
 tute for the Young Blind, of a system of coded dots. She acknowledges her
 admiration for Braille's "strength of character" (225) and his willingness
 to take enormous risks in the face of institutional resistance to adopting
 his new system (a resistance ultimately due, Kleege implies, to sighted
 fear about the ramifications of empowering the blind with the ability to
 read). Identifying with Braille because he "stood up to sighted authority
 and said, 'What you offer is good. What I offer is better"' (225), Kleege in
 turn indicts her own culture's oppressive myths of normalcy and impair-
 ment. And by ending with Braille's story, Sight Unseen wraps itself back
 to the rhetorical mode with which it began: making use of cultural rep-
 resentations of blindness in order to uncover the power dynamics and
 ideological anxieties that contribute to their perpetuation. Braille's life-
 narrative becomes significant at this particular juncture in the text for
 several reasons. By emphasizing Braille's inventiveness, lingering over
 the crafty subterfuge whereby students utilized his system despite the
 threat of expulsion from the school, Kleege implicitly counters the very
 stereotypes of blind helplessness that hindered Braille and his peers. The
 story also provides an historical context for Kleege's insistence on learn-
 ing braille, her own refusal to accommodate herself to the dominance
 of the visual. Braille's system, and his insistence on its usefulness, reso-
 nates with Kleege's own project in Sight Unseen; she too defies cultural
 authority by telling an alternative story of blind identity, by creating a
 new language with which to articulate a blind and female subject. As we
 read Kleege's discovery of Braille and his refusal to accept defeat in the
 face of cultural pressures against his new language, we have been situated
 in Kleege's own position, witnessing her invention of a new vocabulary
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 with which to spell the world and herself within it.'2 And she reminds
 us powerfully that no identity is ever unattached to others in the world;
 far from superseding her voice or story, Braille's narrative is adamantly
 Kleege's-she is the mediator, the translator, the bilingual interpreter,
 the legatee of the freedom of Braille, and the creator thereby of her own
 new story.
 Kleege's effort to locate this alternative father figure is juxtaposed to
 what she reveals about her relationship with her own father, the only
 intimate one to figure prominently in Sight Unseen. The text devotes a
 chapter to him, entitled "A Portrait of the Artist by His Blind Daughter."
 Given that Kleege is so circumspect about other significant relation-
 ships (her husband Nick and her mother, also an artist, are mentioned
 but do not factor as "characters" to nearly the same degree), this singling
 out of the father seems noteworthy, and motivated by two important
 and intertwined thematic issues: patriarchal authority and the father's
 broken body. Kleege states that she "inherited [her] flawed vision" (149)
 from her grandmother, who developed the more common form of age-
 related macular degeneration, and that the linchpin of this connection
 is her father, through whom the "defective gene" passes (150). These two
 other impaired bodies establish a familial legacy of responding to ill-
 ness in ways that reinforce the antagonism of mind and body, defining
 consciousness as if it were at the mercy of an unruly body-unless it can
 be subdued through enormous force of will. Kleege explicitly describes
 her grandmother as a hypochondriac who used illness "to manipulate
 the people around her" (149). Partially sighted, like Kleege-or "imper-
 fectly blind"-the grandmother was suspected of "faking" incapacity, of
 disguising how capable she actually was, so that her health problems
 became a sign of what was assumed to be psychological weakness. The
 father had "doubts about the severity of his mother's blindness," and
 read physical impairment as proof that she was "dependent, fearful, and
 needy" (150). This resentment of, and resistance to, his mother's ailments
 is bound up with Kleege's father's own childhood infirmities-asthma
 and other respiratory problems-and his mother's anxiety about the
 severity of these conditions, which Kleege describes as "almost com-
 pletely debilitating" (151). Not only did Kleege's father learn to suspect
 sickness in his mother as deceptive and manipulative, then, but to also
 deny physical limitations in himself. Kleege writes that he deliberately
 transformed himself into "an extremely athletic adolescent" (151), and
 specifically links the scale and muscularity of her father's artwork to
 his determination to overcome any vestige of the "sickly" child that his
 mother feared he was (and, we are to assume, very nearly produced in
 him).
 Kleege's own vision problems are thus shaped by an environment in
 which women's bodies are viewed as traitorous, their illnesses doubted
This content downloaded from 141.222.114.59 on Fri, 10 Nov 2017 10:58:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 INVISIBLE DISABILITY 171
 as inherently fraudulent, and in which men learn to define selfhood as a
 triumphant transcendence of physical limitation. In the Kleege family, the
 body becomes a source of falsehood and denial, demonized as an instru-
 ment of interpersonal treachery or suppressed as an obstruction to proper
 gendered behavior and parental approval. Kleege admits that she internal-
 ized a sense of guilt about her "flawed vision" (150) and exaggerated her
 self-sufficiency to protect her father not just from the bad feelings associ-
 ated with her "defect" (150), but from his sense of personal inadequacy or
 defectiveness as well: "If I could preserve the illusion of normalcy, I would
 remain unflawed" (150).13 If Kleege's father's relationship with his mother
 is inflected by suspicion, Kleege's relationship with her father serves as
 an index of the ways in which disabled women often experience their
 anomalous bodies as obstacles to specifically male approval and desire.
 While her father's efforts to deny bodily weakness merely reiterate mas-
 culinist norms of singularity and strength, Kleege's similar effort signifies
 a problematic association between denial of self and the need to please an
 authoritative.father. Kleege's father renounces his illness to move away
 from his mother (presumably heightening her worry and therefore linking
 health and autonomy with repudiation of the mother); Kleege disguises
 her illness to move toward her father, assuaging his guilty feelings and
 subsuming her needs into his. When she writes that her father "resisted
 any impulse he might have felt to disable [her] with paternal protection,"
 or that her blindness "never limited his expectations of what [she] could
 do or become" (151), such claims seem somehow disingenuous, particu-
 larly because Kleege also states that her father had a kind of morbid curi-
 osity about her ability to "mask [her] lack of sight" (151). While the father
 may have respected and stimulated Kleege's intellect, his fascination for
 her ability to "fake" sight-for the "artifice" of healthiness-nonethe-
 less imposes on Kleege an explicit association between intimacy and
 normalcy. Kleege writes that because "complaining" about her condition
 "would only make [her] more troublesome and less lovable" (207), she
 impersonates sightedness: "it was . . . easier to pretend that I saw what
 they did" (208), "I could only draw a version of what he saw" (151).14
 Disability repeats itself not only genetically, then, but also ideologi-
 cally, circulating in families who take their cues from cultural attitudes
 toward gender, illness, and generational conflict. "A Portrait of the Artist"
 shows us that art is similarly relational, that it is created not by the
 "vision" of the solitary genius but rather by the many layerings of social
 dynamic. The chapter begins by announcing that Kleege and her father
 "disagree[d]" (139) about eye contact, suggesting again that "Visual expe-
 rience is relative" (139) and thereby initiating an extended meditation on
 the various connections between seeing, disability, and art.'5 The father's
 giant sculptures take shape in direct reaction to Kleege's grandmother's
 attitudes toward bodily ailment. In turn, Kleege's art signifies an explicit
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 break from her father's denial of both his own illness and her blindness.
 Her way of writing-the fact that she is a writer, and not, say, a dancer-
 emerges from her need to tell the story of what she sees, to intervene
 into familial and cultural tale-telling about blindness and gender. In its
 discussion of art, family, and illness, the chapter actively blurs a series
 of binary oppositions, deconstructing the boundaries that separate father
 from daughter, the disabled from the norm, the literal from the repre-
 sentational. Kleege's "portrait of the artist" is thus also a self-portrait,
 exploring the familial and social constructions of blindness, health, and
 gender roles that ultimately inform her identity as a writer.
 When Kleege tries to describe exactly what she sees, she paints in
 words, passages as clearly and lyrically rendered as if she were describing
 an actual painting or writing poetry.'6 Yet she confesses, "Words are only
 the restless prowl around and around the thing I want to name, a spiral
 search from the periphery toward the center. But words are at least a point
 of departure" (153). In a parallel movement, Kleege describes her father's
 return to painting late in his life (too weakened from cancer, emphysema,
 and tuberculosis to continue his metalwork), and the small abstracted
 pieces that resemble the "splinters of color," the "pulsating shimmer"
 of Kleege's own vision (159). Words and painting: each is instigated by
 physical collapse and by a desire to acknowledge both the simultaneous
 failures and continuity of the body. Kleege writes of one of her father's
 paintings: "I could hold it over any image and say, 'This is what I see.' It's
 not quite right.... But it's close enough. A point of departure" (159). The
 repeated phrase-"a point of departure"-joins words and painting in a
 shared understanding that no medium can make stable and solid what-
 ever is threatening to come apart. The polysemic swirl around an absent
 center-words that only haunt the edges, "slashes of color" that "spiral"
 inward as if into the depths of a "cone" (159)-invoke the same "central
 black hole" (153) of Kleege's vision, the "frayed" cells of her retinas (155).
 These metaphorical eddies are precisely the point: there is no transcen-
 dental signified, no "truth" at the center that writing, painting, sculpting,
 or "perfect" vision could ever hold firm. All forms of storytelling, Kleege
 implies, from family legends to cultural mythology, are only a point of
 departure, endless beginnings that initiate inconclusive journeys. It is the
 attempt to travel that matters, Kleege has us understand, and the willing-
 ness to keep one's head turned toward the margins, toward the vibrant
 colors and shapes that occupy the periphery of our vision.17
 Sight Unseen recounts a profound desire to escape the confines of the
 body through the performance of "normalcy," and it describes internal-
 izing tenacious cultural messages that link social acceptance with an
 absence of identifiable difference. Kleege writes, "Offered no means of
 coping with my condition (the word 'blindness' was to be avoided), I did
 everything I could to conceal it" (206-7). Importantly, however, the text
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 also mounts a revolt against the tyranny of the visual, articulating new
 ways of seeing that, instead of wrenching the afflicted body to culture's
 limited narratives of gendered or disabled experience, make the body
 itself the very ground of narrative and subjective authority. Sight Unseen
 at once identifies its author as disabled and resists the stigma associated
 with disability, pointing out the ways in which Kleege's physical condi-
 tion is different while calling attention to the way difference is embed-
 ded in cultural signification, and questioning the fictional and discursive
 terms by which we understand sameness. Where many female autobi-
 ographers-disabled and nondisabled alike-use the performative stage
 of life-writing to rethink the power dynamics of specularity, authoring
 themselves as both subject and object of a reconfigured gaze, Kleege inter-
 rogates the epistemological reliability of sight altogether. In her terms,
 the question of gendered identity has less to do with whether or not she
 controls a subjectifying look, but rather with vision itself and the knowl-
 edge that "normal" eyesight is believed to produce. Even as she claims
 a disabled surface (braille, cane), she unravels a series of binaries that
 would marginalize her from able-bodied circles, whether patriarchal or
 feminist, as defective. Transforming disability into a meaningful vantage
 point, Kleege "announce[s] her blindness without apology" (227).
 Susannah B. Mintz is Assistant Professor of English at Skidmore College
 in Saratoga Springs. She is the author of Threshold Poetics: Milton and
 Intersubjectivity, forthcoming from the University of Delaware Press,
 and is currently completing a manuscript entitled "Writing the Unruly
 Body: Disabled Women's Autobiography."
 Notes
 1. Following Berube, I am referring to the end of Foucault's essay "What is an
 Author," in which he asks, "What difference does it make who is speaking?"
 (qtd. in Berube 2000, 343 n. 3). A piece by Kleege on Helen Keller's memoir
 The Story of My Life also appears in this special edition, entitled "Helen
 Keller and 'The Empire of the Normal"' (2000).
 2. I am thinking particularly of texts by Nancy Mairs and Lucy Grealy, who
 engage in a far more relentless anatomization of their shame, sexual long-
 ings, and acquiescence to patriarchal lessons. See Grealy's Autobiography of
 a Face (1994) and Mairs's several collections of personal essays, particularly
 Plaintext (1986). See also Past Due, by Anne Finger (1986).
 3. On the discontinuities of female experience and autobiography, see Shari Ben-
 stock (1988). Nancy Mairs has written that "A collection of personal essays
 stutters-begins, halts, shifts, begins anew," in a way that reflects but also
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 resists the cultural disenfranchisement of the woman writer (1994, 79); and
 G. Thomas Couser's Recovering Bodies: Illness, Disability, and Life Writing
 discusses the various narrative strategies that frame personal stories of dis-
 ability and illness (1997).
 4. Zizek claims that "if we look at a thing straight on, i.e., matter-of-factly,
 disinterestedly, objectively, we see nothing but a formless spot; the object
 assumes clear and distinctive features only if we look at it 'at an angle,' i.e.,
 with an 'interested' view, supported, permeated, and 'distorted' by desire"
 (1992, 11-2).
 5. As one index of feminist trust in vision, consider Deborah Peifer's account
 of the effect gradual blindness had on her experience as a lesbian. "When I
 first came out as a lesbian," Peifer writes, "one of the things that confirmed
 my dykeness was the way other lesbians looked at me ... [H]ow they gazed
 was an absolute indicator" (1999, 32). After becoming legally blind, the loss
 of visual interaction with other women produced "a sense of isolation that
 is sometimes overwhelming" (33). Peifer claims that because she is unable
 to see others or to see herself being seen by them, her "gaydar" (31) is dimin-
 ished, disrupting the relational matrix from which she derives a sense of
 stable identity. Kleege, by contrast, discovers other physical ways of making
 contact.
 6. A point of comparison here may be Jim Knipfel's memoir Slackjaw (1999),
 in which the author's "stupid little story" (xi) about losing his vision to
 retinitis pigmentosa takes precedence over a cultural analysis of blindness
 as both a material and discursive condition. Knipfel presents his narrative
 as an "honest" depiction of how blindness is "a big pain in the ass" (231), a
 self-consciously ironized send-up not only of his own stubborn resistance to
 the accoutrements of blindness, but of nearly everyone else who appears in
 the book-other blind people, those who assist the blind, women, academics,
 and so on. While Slackjaw was enthusiastically received for its apparently
 unsentimental depiction of disease, it is nonetheless a troublingly aggressive
 text that does not, in contrast to Sight Unseen, encourage its readers to par-
 ticipate in a thoughtful reevaluation of their own assumptions about vision.
 Where Kleege ascribes a lyrical and fundamentally intersubjective basis to
 her (diminished) way of looking, Knipfel's relation to the world tends to seem
 violent and mean, his descriptions of women often blithely disparaging, and
 his representation of his own blindness marked by dichotomies of enraged
 failure and mythic control.
 7. Kleege's language of "faking"-like her assertion of "passing"-seems aimed
 at provoking deep-seated anxieties about "others" breaking down or infiltrat-
 ing the hegemonic power structure of Western culture. If women can fake
 orgasm, and racial minorities pass as white, how are stable relationships of
 sexual and racial mastery to be maintained? The fact that Kleege can fake eye
 contact and thus "pass" as sighted makes her social position a threateningly
 liminal one, which she rhetorically maximizes. In a slightly different way,
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 her claim that Sight Unseen is a "coming out" story emphasizes not only her
 solidarity with a group blind identity, but also the potential affront that such
 allegiance might constitute for sighted readers. In each case, Kleege subtly
 undermines sighted complacency about knowing who Kleege "is."
 8. In defense of listening to books on tape, for example, Kleege writes that
 "reading this way almost always feels like a shared experience. I feel myself
 not merely a passive audience but engaged in a kind of exchange. Readers
 are not reading to me; we are reading together. I have a sense of a continu-
 ous back-and-forth commentary.... This is precisely what confounds the
 sighted reader who thinks of reading as a private and intensely personal act,
 a solo flight" (181). Kleege claims that reading aloud to someone is an "act of
 generosity that should never be underesteemed" (191).
 9. The distinction between different and deviant is made by Rosemarie Garland
 Thomson (1997, 23).
 10. One thinks of Audre Lorde here, offering a "new spelling of [her] name"
 in her bio-mythography Zami (1982). See also the introductory chapter of
 Jeanne Perreault's Writing Selves for a discussion of the indeterminate "I"
 of women's autobiography and the political intersections of self-naming and
 group identification (1995).
 11. I will follow Kleege here in using the lower case braille for the system of
 raised dots, upper case Braille for the inventor of that system.
 12. Sight Unseen is itself available in both braille and on cassette, recorded by
 Terry Hayes Sales (1999b).
 13. In her discussion of the intertwining of her father's art, the family's various
 ailments, and her relationship with her parents, Kleege repeats the words
 "flaw," "flaws," and "flawed" seven times in just three pages, as if unwit-
 tingly articulating a worry that her father's awareness of her blindness might
 impede their closeness.
 14. A similar sentiment recurs throughout Lucy Grealy's Autobiography of a
 Face (1994), which links the atypical shape of Grealy's face (a sizeable
 portion of her jaw having been removed due to cancer) to being ugly and
 therefore unlovable. In contrast, Jim Knipfel's efforts to mask his decreasing
 eyesight seem aimed not so much at retaining affection but rather guarding
 his autonomy (1999). Grealy and Kleege discuss their experiences in specifi-
 cally relational terms; Knipfel speaks in terms of "pride and self-sufficiency,"
 "determination and cold viciousness" (1999, 225, 227), presenting himself as a
 solitary individual whose encroaching blindness exposes him to the vulner-
 ability of neediness.
 15. Kleege reveals ambivalence about whether or not her father's vision can be
 relied upon; she both appreciates the "unfailing accuracy" of his artist's gaze
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 and acknowledges his inability to perceive the extent of her impairment (143).
 She writes, "I had to believe that my father was someone who could read the
 language of the eyes" (139). Yet the "language of the eyes" has been under
 erasure throughout Sight Unseen, its validity-or at least its stability-thor-
 oughly contested. In fact, as the ensuing essay makes clear, Kleege and her
 father share an understanding that seeing has as much to do with touch,
 with pre-existing beliefs, and with a priori conceptions of reality, than with
 anything like pure vision.
 16. Training her writer's vision on the politics, the physics, the symbolism of
 seeing, Kleege travels back and forth between scientific and symbolic dis-
 course. At times, there is clinical precision to her descriptions of both what
 her eyes can see, and how she actually goes about doing the seeing. Dis-
 ability scholars might point out that Kleege's ability to penetrate to the core
 of her own eyeballs so technically is a sign of her capitulation to a medical
 model (that we view our bodies largely through medical language and thus
 as unrelated parts or things, disconnected from a controlling consciousness)
 of disability. But Kleege achieves two important representational goals: first,
 she complicates the authority of medical discourse by setting it against her
 own-she still has epistemic authority in her story. Second, Kleege uses sci-
 entific language as an antidote (anecdote?) to the literary and mythological
 connotations of blindness that comprise the first two chapters of her text.
 Despite the problems of attending to the so-called medical model, Kleege has
 a great deal of cultural baggage about vision to cut through. Her descriptions
 of what happens during fear or eye contact, then (e.g., the skin stretching, or
 certain parts of the brain being activated), move these activities away from
 the realm of popular belief, superstition, and myth, and into something more
 mundane, less charged with mystery and entrenched assumptions.
 17. Compare Kleege's concern to make disability an alternative (and rebellious)
 vantage point from which the nondisabled might think more critically about
 themselves with Knipfel's remark, towards the end of Slackjawv that "Going
 blind ... has been my salvation. . . -or my karmic retribution" (1999, 231).
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